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The History of Veterans’ Policy in the United States: 
A Comparative Overview 
Olivier Burtin∗ 
Abstract: »Die Geschichte der Veteranenpolitik in den Vereinigten Staaten: Ein 
vergleichender Überblick«. The United States is one of the foremost examples of 
a country that adopted an “exclusive” approach to veterans’ policy: namely, 
where welfare programs for veterans are treated separately from those cover-
ing the rest of the population. Ranging from free healthcare to old-age pen-
sion to civil service preference, former U.S. soldiers have access to a wide range 
of benefits administered by a single federal entity, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA). Though these programs are more varied and expensive than any-
where else in the world, their origin remains unexplored. This is not only be-
cause scholars of the welfare state have tended to focus on programs targeting 
traditionally marginalized groups, but also because scholars of veterans’ affairs 
rarely place their topic in the larger context of U.S. social policy. Both gaps 
stem from the prevailing assumption that veterans are one of the few privi-
leged groups in American society whose benefits do not fall under the category 
of “welfare” but instead of earned rights. This paper bridges this divide by 
adopting a threefold approach: it places veterans’ benefits within the frame-
work of the U.S. welfare state as a whole, it retraces their evolution from the 
colonial period to the Vietnam War, and it sets the U.S. experience in compara-
tive perspective. In doing so, it highlights a series of factors that reflected not 
only the specific nature of warfare in U.S. history – such as its frequency and 
intensity – but also its timing and the fact that it rarely caused major civilian 
casualties or economic destruction, which allowed veterans to claim that they 
alone bore war’s burden – but also of its political system – for instance, the 
country’s relative political stability and the fact that the early extension of 
white male suffrage allowed U.S. veterans to influence politics before their 
counterparts in other industrialized countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The range of veterans’ benefits available in the United States today is remarka-
bly varied. The budget of the cabinet agency in charge of all programs for 
former soldiers (the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, better known as the 
VA) is projected to reach an all-time high of 220 billion dollars for fiscal year 
2020. With a staff of over 370,000, the VA is in charge of a total veteran popu-
lation of over 18 million, for whom it administers not only healthcare benefits 
(via the single largest integrated hospital system in the nation), but also disabil-
ity and death pensions, education benefits, job search services, and life insur-
ance, among other programs. Veterans applying for civil service jobs at the 
federal and state level are also entitled to preference over other applicants: as a 
result, they currently make up for almost a third of the federal workforce de-
spite accounting for only about 6 percent of the total population (Office of 
Personnel Management 2017; Lewis 2013). Non-U.S. citizens who served in 
the military (as well as their relatives) can be naturalized under more favorable 
conditions. Finally, former soldiers enjoy various local or state-level benefits 
such as tax breaks. Together, these various programs form what I call the “vet-
erans’ welfare state”: a range of benefits available only to former soldiers and 
to their relatives or survivors, which are similar to but legally separate from the 
policies available to civilians. 
From a comparative standpoint, this parallel welfare state represents an unu-
sual policy outcome. To be sure, the United States is far from the only country 
to administer veterans’ benefits through a separate agency (so do Canada and 
Australia, for instance). Rather than its separate nature, what sets the United 
States apart is the breadth and depth of its system. Put another way, the country 
offers its former soldiers more types of benefits and on more liberal terms than 
virtually any other. Not only is the U.S. one of the very few nations to provide 
its veterans with programs such as educational benefits, job assistance, and life 
insurance, but it also compensates them for a large range of non-service-
connected disabilities, whereas most other countries tend to limit such assis-
tance to military service (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993). Historically, 
U.S. veterans have also tended to enjoy more liberal civil service preference 
terms (Miller 1935; Baruch 1945). In other words, the United States is perhaps 
the foremost example of what some scholars have called the “exclusive” ap-
proach to veterans’ policy, which treats former soldiers not on the same level as 
the rest of the population but rather as a separate “status group” entitled to 
preferential treatment (Danilova 2010; Crotty and Edele 2013).  
This phenomenon is so deeply embedded in American life that it has largely 
avoided the attention of social scientists. Most scholars of the U.S. welfare 
state have focused on programs that targeted traditionally marginalized catego-
ries of the population, such as single mothers, racial minorities, and the poor. 
As a result, they have largely neglected the major role played by war veterans 
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(a group that until recently was made up almost exclusively of white men) in 
the growth of social policy. Scholars of veterans’ affairs have for their part 
tended to study their topic separately, failing to place it within the larger con-
text of the welfare state. Both of these blind spots stem from the same assump-
tion, which is especially pervasive among scholars native to the United States: 
namely, that former soldiers are a deserving group of the population whose 
benefits should be seen not as “welfare” (a term often negatively understood as 
connoting handouts for the undeserving poor) but rather as “earned rights.” In 
accepting this dichotomy, scholars (and the general public) have treated as 
natural something that was in fact the result of a contingent historical process, 
in which veterans have defended their material interests by asserting their supe-
riority over civilians. Rather than taking the division between “welfare” and 
“veterans” for granted, the article follows its development over time in order to 
understand how U.S. social policy came to treat former soldiers as a distinct 
group, separate from the rest of the population. 
To do so, the article follows a threefold approach. First, it sets the American 
experience in comparative perspective. This is a new approach, since almost all 
studies of U.S. veterans’ benefits focus on this country alone. Only by means of 
comparison can we break from this exceptionalist perspective and understand 
the specificities of the U.S. case. Second, the article places veterans’ benefits in 
the larger context of U.S. social policy. The point here is to remind us that 
these programs are only one branch of the broader welfare state and that their 
separate status is a rather recent development in American history (for similar 
approaches, see Skocpol 1992; Jensen 2003). Third, the article traces the evolu-
tion of veterans’ benefits from the colonial period to the Vietnam War (the last 
conflict on which substantial research is available). This long-term approach 
represents a departure from scholars’ traditional focus on veterans of a single 
war (Ortiz 2012), which is why we still lack a comprehensive overview en-
compassing the kind of “big, slow-moving” processes that unfolded over more 
than one generation (Pierson 2003).  
By bringing these three perspectives together, we can see that the develop-
ment of veterans’ policy in the United States was not the result of an excep-
tional cultural tradition but rather of a succession of contingent factors.  
Drawing on Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney’s theory of institutional 
change (Thelen and Mahoney 2003), we can describe the history of U.S. veter-
ans’ policy as a long and path-dependent process driven in large part by the 
unpredictable “exogenous shocks” of wars, which provoked rapid spurs of 
expansion at irregular intervals. A similar process followed each conflict, in 
which veterans’ pressure and budget surpluses led to new benefits being slowly 
“layered” on top of existing ones and initially strict access rules being gradual-
ly “displaced” by looser ones, thereby increasing the number of beneficiaries. 
The extension of benefits from service-connected to non-service-connected 
recipients was the foremost example of this process. Another striking feature of 
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the history of the U.S. veterans’ welfare state is how little success its oppo-
nents, or “insurrectionaries,” have had. While critics were able at times to halt 
or slow its growth, they never succeeded in rolling it back entirely. This was 
not because everyone agreed that former soldiers deserved more privileges, but 
because politicians often acted as “opportunists” who feared the damage that 
being branded as “anti-veteran” could cause them at the ballot box and chose 
the path of least resistance. The U.S. veterans’ movement never really faced the 
same kind of organized countermovement that the labor or the civil rights 
movement did, which explains its success in making demands upon the state.  
More specifically, the distinct nature of warfare in U.S. history helped pro-
duce a more comprehensive and exclusive set of benefits. For instance, the 
remarkable frequency with which the country practiced war-making (so often 
that some scholars have called it a “habit”) meant that it had to deal with the 
problem of how to treat large numbers of veterans earlier and more often than 
many of its industrialized counterparts (Sherry 2018). The fact that most wars 
waged by the United States did not result either in large numbers of deaths 
among its own civilian population or in massive damages to its domestic econ-
omy also meant that – similar to other countries like Australia or Canada, but 
contrary to post-World War II Germany or Japan – “war-induced needs were 
largely restricted to soldiers and their dependents,” which made their claims to 
separate status more compelling (Obinger et al. 2018, 430). It further meant 
that the United States tended to have the wherewithal necessary to finance 
generous outlays on veterans’ programs. In addition, the periodic use of the 
national draft between 1863 and 1973 made veterans’ demands harder to resist, 
for they could claim that the state owed them something in return for having 
forcibly interrupted the course of their lives as civilians. Finally, the successful 
conclusion of most of these wars endowed U.S. veterans with an aura of pres-
tige that legitimized their claims. 
Outside of war itself, several other mechanisms played an important role. 
Most fundamental was the fact that the United States did not experience regime 
change: political stability meant that veterans were almost always able to make 
their claims on the same regime that had sent them to war, which enhanced 
their legitimacy.
1
 Timing also mattered: the fact that the United States engaged 
in acts of warfare regularly, on a large scale, and with successful results before 
it developed an expansive social safety net available to most citizens meant that 
its veteran population had a clear incentive to seek its own set of benefits. 
Since the country adopted white male suffrage at a comparatively early time in 
world history, its veterans (who overwhelmingly belonged to this category of 
the population) could exert pressure on the political system in ways that their 
                                                             
1  The only exception to this rule shows its importance: veterans of the Confederacy, who were 
of course on the losing side of the Civil War, were thereafter barred from nearly all federal 
benefits. 
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counterparts from other nations could not. Finally, path dependence was key: 
over the course of several centuries, the early steps taken toward an exclusive 
veterans’ policy became deeply entrenched in the structure not only of the state 
(in the form of separate executive agencies and congressional committees) but 
also of civil society (with the existence of a powerful veterans’ movement). 
Given these powerful counterweights, critics found it increasingly hard to steer 
the country onto a different course. The result is the United States that we 
know today, where social policy treats veterans as a group above and apart 
from the rest of the civilian population.  
This article proceeds chronologically, following the slow process of policy 
evolution from its roots in the colonial period through the successive transfor-
mations wrought by the Revolution, the Civil War, and the global conflicts of 
the 20th century. 
2. Body 
The first laws providing veterans’ benefits in the early modern period were the 
result of the military revolution (Rogers 1995). Faced with the need to recruit 
soldiers for their increasingly large standing armies, which in turn produced 
growing populations of disabled ex-soldiers, many European states began to 
offer their veterans various types of advantages, often drawing on models from 
ancient Rome. For instance, Spain and many other nations founded hospitals 
for disabled veterans beginning in the late 16th century, the same period when 
England passed its first veterans’ pension law. Soon after, disbanded officers of 
the British Army were given half pay, and various systems were employed to 
help sustain their widows. States like France, Prussia, or Russia also offered 
their veterans preferential treatment in access to civil service positions ( 
Glasson 1918, 9-12; Van Ells 2001, 3-5). 
British colonial settlers on the North American continent were thus only 
building upon a well-established trend when, following the lead of the Plym-
outh colony in 1636, they began to pass laws providing relief for disabled or 
sick soldiers as a way to encourage military service. Other colonies like Mary-
land or New York also used pension legislation to motivate enlistment; Rhode 
Island had the most comprehensive of all (Glasson 1918, 15-7). A long history 
of colonial warfare against Native American nations or competing European 
empires helps explain why veterans’ benefits were already a familiar feature 
long before the 13 colonies came together to form the United States. 
In this sense, the Revolution marked less a turning point than the consolida-
tion of policies that had already existed for over a century. To keep the military 
afloat in the middle of its civil war with Great Britain, some of the first laws 
passed by the Continental Congress in 1776 were to provide half-pay for life 
for officers as well as pensions for invalid soldiers. The former measure gener-
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ated a fierce debate: since the Revolution was in part motivated by republican 
fears of the corrupting effect of “standing armies” and by rejection of the aris-
tocratic society of Europe, many found the idea of creating a permanent caste 
of ex-officers receiving public subsidies unpalatable. Only the fear of more 
resignations or desertions convinced Congress to pass this law, which it com-
muted a few years later under public pressure into the equivalent of only five-
years’ pay in government certificates (Glasson 1918, 24-30; Jensen 2003, 57). 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, both Congress and the general public 
held veterans of the Continental Army in low regard, believing that independ-
ence had been won as much by them as by “citizen-soldiers” (militiamen who 
had served for a short period before returning home). Compounded by the new 
nation’s unsteady finances, these sentiments forced Congress to reduce pen-
sions to a paltry level. As patriotic feelings grew in the wake of the War of 
1812, however, more and more Americans began to view Revolutionary veter-
ans as symbols of the new nation and to express gratitude for their service 
(Resch 1999). Two years after a large budget surplus in 1816, Congress thus 
extended pensions to veterans “in need of assistance” for the first time, instead 
of merely to those with service-connected disabilities (Glasson 1918, 67). Pen-
sion advocates stemmed mostly from Northern and Middle Atlantic states, not 
only because a majority of Revolutionary veterans lived there but also because 
those states saw the high cost of veterans’ pensions as one way to justify main-
taining a strong tariff that would protect their own industrial base (Jensen 2003, 
111-16). However, the number of veterans who submitted claims under the 
1818 law far exceeded expectations, prompting a Congressional investigation 
that resulted in purges of the public rolls (though many pensioners were re-
stored a few years later during a new period of budget surplus; Glasson 1918, 
71-4). In the 1830s, pensions were extended to all veterans with over two years 
of service regardless of income and a growing number of widows were granted 
payments ( Glasson 1918, 91; Jensen 2003, 117). 
In sum, the years that followed the Revolutionary War witnessed the first 
manifestation of a pattern that would repeat itself in the future. Though the 
benefits adopted in wartime were initially limited to service-connected deaths 
or disabilities, over the course of the postwar period they were gradually ex-
panded to include widows and orphans, as well as soldiers whose disability had 
been incurred after discharge (becoming in effect based on service alone, hence 
the name of “service pensions”). By the time the last beneficiary of Revolu-
tionary pensions passed away (in 1906), this system had benefited over 70,000 
soldiers, sailors, and widows, for a total cost of approximately $70 million 
(Glasson 1918, 95-6). 
Two further points about this period are worth stressing here. First, pension 
legislation was not the result of organized pressure by veterans’ groups but 
rather of widespread feelings of nationalism, nostalgia, and gratitude. The 
organizations that represented the veterans’ movement during this period, such 
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as the Society of Cincinnati (for officers) or the Society of St. Tammany (for 
enlisted soldiers), were still small and had little influence on national politics ( 
Davies 1955, 3-20; Pencak 1984). Second, these laws shaped the development 
of the U.S. welfare state more broadly. As Laura Jensen has argued, the 1818 
pension law was the first piece of legislation to entitle a specific group of the 
population to federal benefits. As such, it set into motion a process whereby 
future social policy would be more likely to follow not a universal but a selec-
tive pattern. This was the case not only because it encouraged other categories 
of the population to demand similar treatment, but also because the establish-
ment of a separate system so early in the country’s history created state actors 
(such as the Bureau of Pensions in 1815) with a vested interest in maintaining 
their own separate status. Their entrenchment only grew over time, helping 
buttress the claims of those who championed an exclusive approach to veter-
ans’ policy (Jensen 2003).  
In addition to monetary assistance, Revolutionary veterans also received 
public land warrants. These plots were initially located in specific military 
districts on the western frontier, so as to create a buffer to protect white settlers 
from Native American attacks. By 1860, an area larger than the current state of 
Arizona (over 73.5 million acres) had been distributed in this way to former 
soldiers of all wars from the Revolution to the conflict with Mexico. As with 
pensions, this system set an important precedent for other major state-building 
initiatives, such as the use of land grants to finance public colleges or the build-
ing of railroads (Oberly 1990; Rockoff 2006, 342). 
From a comparative standpoint, such policies were far from unique. For in-
stance, at the turn of the 19th century Revolutionary and Napoleonic France 
also recognized that the state owed a “sacred debt” to its veterans, which it paid 
in the form of pensions and land grants – though these were often of a more 
limited nature (Woloch 1979, 316). These measures were a common solution to 
the familiar problem of how to deal with the demobilization of large standing 
armies when few alternative sources of public support existed. Where the Unit-
ed States differed from other countries was in extending such programs even to 
those veterans who had not been disabled in service. Throughout the 19th cen-
tury, for instance, Great Britain nearly always avoided granting “statutory 
rights to servicemen in the form of war pensions or dependents’ allowances” 
(Hally 2019, 29), while successive French governments from the Bourbon 
Restoration to the Third Republic also refused to provide fully for veterans’ 
welfare and conserved their discretionary power to decide who would be grant-
ed assistance (Petiteau 2003).  
A few factors contributed to this distinctive path. First, the comparatively 
smaller numbers of U.S. veterans help explain why lawmakers were less reluc-
tant to grant them generous benefits. Although the 16,000 veterans who quali-
fied under the 1818 law were far more than what had been expected, they re-
mained a much smaller group than the 140,000 who were receiving pensions in 
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1817 in France – themselves only a fraction of the eligible population (Petiteau 
2003, 94; Cogan 2017, 16). The political stability of the United States also 
played a role. After their return, the veterans who had served from 1775 to 
1783 could make their claims on the same government that had sent them to 
war, which enhanced their legitimacy. By contrast, after Napoleon was over-
thrown in 1815 his veterans faced a newly restored monarchy that regarded 
with suspicion those who had fought for its sworn enemy. The Bourbons often 
rescinded the benefits of soldiers who had taken part in the Hundred Days 
(Petiteau 2003, 92-6). Finally, the fact that the United States extended universal 
white male suffrage earlier than its European counterparts was significant 
(Keyssar 2009). Since U.S. veterans overwhelmingly belonged to this category 
of the population, it gave them the ability to exert direct pressure on their rep-
resentatives through tools such as petitions drives and public demonstrations, 
which made their demands harder to resist (Oberly 1985). 
The Civil War (1861-1865) further consolidated the early moves taken by 
the United States toward an exclusive policy. The “general law system” of 
pensions adopted in 1862 was initially limited to disabilities or deaths that were 
connected with service, but it was gradually expanded during the postwar peri-
od until it covered nearly every ex-soldier and their survivors. By 1907, a law 
effectively granted a pension to all Union veterans older than 62 regardless of 
disability (Blanck and Millender 2000, 9). There were 900,000 pensioners in 
1910, with their benefits administered by a separate agency, the Pension Bu-
reau (Glasson 1918, 273). Many of the conditions that produced this outcome 
were the same as in previous years: a large number of white, male, former 
soldiers returned home endowed with the aura of victory and able to make 
claims on the same regime that had sent them to war, in a context where social 
policy remained underdeveloped. In addition, the fact that some of them had 
been conscripted made their claims on the state even more difficult to resist. 
The result was a massive expansion of veterans’ welfare state. Put simply, 
the Civil War was the first conflict in which the total cost of veterans’ benefits 
topped that of the war itself (Carter et al. 2006, Table Ed168-179 ). From 1880 
to 1910, over a quarter of all federal spending was devoted to Civil War pen-
sions, with a peak at 40 percent in 1890 (Skocpol 1992, 65; Rockoff 2006, 
344). This was in part the result of the dramatic increase in the number of re-
cipients: the Civil War produced around 2.2 million veterans on the Union side, 
the largest cohort of former soldiers to this point in U.S. history. But higher 
costs also reflected the creation of new kinds of benefits: the state not only 
offered veterans pensions and land grants, but it also established homes to care 
for the old and indigent. By 1900, 100,000 Union veterans lived in them (Kelly 
1997; Van Ells 2001, 10). In addition, the federal government gave former 
soldiers preference for jobs in civil service. Benefits available at the state and 
local levels were even more expansive (Marten 2011, 240-1). Veterans of the 
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Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War were later given 
access to much of these same programs. 
Other factors specific to the post-Civil War period contributed to this expan-
sion. For instance, the late-19th century witnessed the emergence of interest 
groups as important players in U.S. politics, from labor to women’s rights to 
agriculture (Clemens 1997). Union veterans played a central role in this larger 
process, with the creation of the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) in 1866. 
Initially focused on social and charitable activities, beginning in the early 
1880s the group devoted itself almost single-mindedly to advocating for more 
generous benefits on behalf of its constituents. With 400,000 members in 1890, 
it was one of the most powerful lobbies of the Gilded Age and a fervent believ-
er in the ideal of martial citizenship – the view that veterans formed a select 
group of citizens entitled to privileged treatment by virtue of their military 
service (Davies 1955; McConnell 1992). Expert at pressuring both the execu-
tive and legislative branches, the GAR played a key role in lobbying for the 
successive laws that made pensions increasingly generous. When an individual 
benefit claim was denied administratively, Congress often intervened with a 
special pension bill on that person’s behalf: from 1865 to 1917, legislators 
passed a total of 53,000 private pension bills (Glasson 1918, 280). Though this 
triangular relationship between the GAR, the Bureau, and Congress was never 
as rigid as critics have portrayed it to be, it nevertheless went a long way to-
ward explaining why veterans’ spending reached new highs during this period.  
Indeed, the United States was perhaps the first country to witness the politi-
cization of its veterans’ movement. In Great Britain, for instance, “the first 
national organization set up and run by veterans, for veterans, not as a social 
club, regimental association or traditional charity, but as a political pressure 
group” was not founded until 1917 (Hally 2019, 22). Veterans’ groups existed 
in other countries, to be sure (in Austria, the first one was created in 1820), but 
they often limited their activities to participating in war commemorations, 
undertaking relief work, and providing a social outlet for their members (James 
2016, 78-9).  
As a result of this early start, by the turn of the 20th century the U.S. veter-
ans’ welfare state was an international outlier. Broadly speaking, prior to 
World War I veterans’ benefits in most other industrialized countries – includ-
ing not just Europe but also Japan and Australia – remained either non-existent 
or rudimentary (Obinger, Petersen, and Starke 2018). In fact, U.S. programs 
were so extensive that they sometimes overshadowed the more universal sys-
tems implemented in certain Western European countries (Skocpol 1992). As 
one contemporary expert noted, in the United States  
the military pension system has acted in great measure as a workingman’s 
pension system. Many of the old men and women who, in Europe, would be in 
almshouses are found in the US living upon pensions with their children or in 
homes to which paupers are not sent. (Henderson 1909, 276-7)  
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Another one claimed that in the 1910s, the United States was spending “more 
than three times” more on its veterans’ pensions than the entire “British pen-
sion system,” and that “our pension roll numbers several hundred thousand 
more names than that of Great Britain” (Rubinow 1913, 404). The U.S. system 
was so extensive, in fact, that British and Canadian officials who opposed 
extending the same kind of statutory entitlements to their own veterans would 
later cite it as a cautionary tale (Morton and Wright 1987, chap. 3; Hally 2019, 
21).  
Outsiders were not the only ones to express reservations about the colossal 
scale of Civil War pensions. Progressives in the United States voiced their 
disapproval as well. Not only did they allege that the system was plagued by 
widespread patronage and corruption, but they also argued that it allowed vet-
erans to avoid work, thereby encouraging idleness and dependence instead of 
productive and “manly” work habits (Linker 2011). By the 1910s, the GAR no 
longer stood in the way of their reform efforts: death had so thinned out the 
ranks of Union veterans that the group was but a shadow of its former self. 
Progressives therefore welcomed the decision of Woodrow Wilson to join the 
First World War in April 1917 as an opportunity for them to chart a new course 
in this field.  
In a process that would be repeated time and again in the years to come, the 
design of veterans’ policy during the Great War was therefore in large measure 
a reaction against the perceived flaws of the legislation adopted during the 
previous major conflict. Rather than extending the pension system created in 
1862, Congress devised a brand-new program whose cornerstone was the War 
Risk Insurance Act of 1917. The overarching goal behind this new law was to 
preempt the future growth of another set of ruinously expensive benefits, by 
forcing veterans to return to civilian life as quickly as possible and by settling 
all debts that the state might still owe them upon discharge. In an attempt to 
avoid the return of a service pension, the act provided “Doughboys” with up to 
$10,000 in life insurance at advantageous rates (which they could keep after the 
war) and it limited pensions strictly to those recipients whose disability or 
death had occurred in the line of duty. Disabled veterans could take advantage 
of new medical care and rehabilitation services, which Progressives hoped 
would “cure” their impairment and return them to a productive status as wage-
earners once and for all. Seeing the Pension Bureau as hopelessly corrupt, the 
law vested authority for these new programs in other agencies. In short, Pro-
gressives hoped that the new system would pave the way toward a more inclu-
sive model of veterans’ policy in which former soldiers would be treated on a 
similar basis to the rest of the population (Linker 2011; Kinder 2015, pt. II; 
Adler 2017). 
Not unlike what had happened after the Revolutionary and the Civil Wars, 
however, wartime legislation was quickly superseded by a spate of more gen-
erous laws in the postwar period. One of the reasons for this policy change was 
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a lack of foresight on the part of Wilson and his administration: taken aback by 
the sudden collapse of Austria-Hungary and Germany in November 1918, they 
had had little time to plan for the demobilization effort. The agencies charged 
with assisting veterans proved unable to deal with the flood of pension claims, 
while former soldiers often had trouble finding their way through the new 
bureaucratic maze. The economic recession that started a few months after the 
armistice compounded these problems, as did allegations that the head of the 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance Charles R. Forbes, who took the lead in dealing 
with veterans’ problems, had embezzled large amounts of public funds (Ste-
vens 2016). This chaotic context created a political opening for the veterans’ 
movement, which pushed for more generous benefits. 
The story of the next decade or so after the war is therefore to a large extent 
that of how the Progressive vision for a new model of veterans’ policy unrav-
eled under the relentless assaults of veterans’ groups. Foremost among them 
was the American Legion, a World War I-only group created in 1919, the Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars (VFW), initially open only to veterans of the Spanish-
American War but later expanded to all those who had served abroad, and the 
Disabled American Veterans, an organization advocating for those who had 
been disabled in service. Though they represented different subgroups of the 
veteran community whose interests did not always coincide, these three organi-
zations shared with the GAR a common belief in martial citizenship. Over the 
next few years, they were successful in rolling back Progressives’ more inclu-
sive approach. Not only did they manage to bring the administration of all 
veterans’ programs under a single and separate roof for the first time (with the 
merger of existing agencies into the Veterans Administration in 1930), but they 
also won passage of two major laws in 1924: one that provided for the future 
payment of “adjusted compensation” – a sum meant to compensate veterans for 
the wages that they felt they had lost by joining the military, which their critics 
derided as a “Bonus” – and another that extended eligibility for medical bene-
fits to patients whose disabilities were not connected to military service. In 
other words, World War I veterans obtained precisely what Progressives had 
hoped to permanently eradicate: the extension of benefits to veterans without 
service-connection and the creation of an executive agency that recognized 
their separate status.  
The result was a system whose cost once again exploded. Throughout the 
second half of the 1920s, slightly more than one-fourth of the federal budget 
went to veterans’ benefits (Ross 1969, 24). At its peak in 1932, the VA was 
spending over $830 million and more than a quarter of all veterans of the Great 
War were receiving a pension (Carter et al. 2006, Table Ed297-310 and Ed337-
350). That same year, almost two-thirds of the 43,000 veteran patients remain-
ing in hospitals were treated for non-service-connected disabilities, a dramatic 
increase compared with 1925 when they made up only 14 percent of 26,000 
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patients (Annual Report 1941, 49). Clearly, the Progressives’ experiment had 
been short-lived. 
The United States was far from the only country to devote large amounts of 
resources to the welfare of World War I veterans. In France and Germany, such 
programs were respectively the third and the second largest items on the budget 
in 1932 (Jedell 1932; Philip 1932). Nor was it the only one to set up a separate 
administrative structure in charge of their welfare programs: Great Britain, 
Canada, and Australia adopted a similar approach and provided many of the 
same types of benefits (Garton 1996; Morton 1998; Barr 2005). Rather, what 
set the United States apart was the comparative generosity of its veterans’ 
spending, which in 1932 was as high as that of Great Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, and Canada combined (New York Times 1932). This was all the more 
remarkable in light of the fact that the country had suffered far fewer casualties 
and mobilized fewer soldiers than other belligerents – a mere 234,000 out of 
4.7 million, when France alone had suffered 5.6 million casualties out of an 
army of 8.3 million. Again, this difference stemmed from the wider range of 
benefits that the United States made available even to those former soldiers 
whose disabilities were not directly connected to service. A few other countries 
adopted the same approach but never to the same extent (in 1930 for instance, 
France granted a small old-age pension to Great War veterans above the age of 
50; Prost 1992, 38; Cabanes 2014). 
A brief comparison with the situation in Western Europe highlights some of 
the reasons behind this discrepancy. The first is perhaps the most obvious: 
while the Great War severely weakened European economies, it had the oppo-
site effect on the United States (Nolan 2012). There, the presence of large 
federal budget surpluses in the 1920s made it harder for advocates of economy 
to push back against veterans’ demands (Cogan 2017, 58). Also important was 
the fact that U.S. veterans’ groups did not face strong opponents. In Britain, the 
existence of a powerful labor movement proved a major obstacle. Not only did 
trade unions and their allies in the Labor Party tend to see veterans’ organiza-
tions as potential competitors that might divide their working-class base, but 
they also opposed in principle the idea that former soldiers should be granted 
privileges over workers (Morris 2019). The comparative weakness of the U.S. 
labor movement meant that it was never in a position to block the emergence of 
groups like the Legion or the VFW. Lastly, the U.S. veterans’ movement bene-
fited from its nonpartisan approach, contrary to countries like Germany where 
veterans’ groups were divided along political lines (with the nationalist Stahl-
helm, the social-democratic Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold, and the Com-
munist-affiliated Roter Frontkämpferbund; Whalen 1984). In the United States, 
major veterans’ groups learned from the example of the GAR (whose affilia-
tion with the Republican Party helped tar the Civil War pension system with 
accusations of patronage). Remaining largely nonpartisan throughout the in-
terwar period, they were able to exert influence on whichever party was in 
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power. All these mechanisms – economic stability, the absence of a counter-
movement, and bipartisanship – contributed to the remarkable expansion of the 
U.S. veterans’ welfare state in the first half of the interwar period. 
This growth was temporarily slowed by the onset of the Great Depression in 
1929, but never fully stopped. In the context of the economic downturn, lavish 
benefits for veterans provoked mounting cries of a “racket” (Burlingame 1932). 
Drawing on this backlash, one of the first pieces of legislation that President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed upon taking office in 1933 was the Economy 
Act, which allowed him to cut $460 million in veterans’ programs and to repeal 
the service pension for veterans of the Great War. This was only the second 
time in U.S. history that veterans’ benefits were cut by law (the first was in 
1820) and the first time that a service pension was repealed (Ross 1969, 26; 
Ortiz 2010, 75; Rostker 2013, 171). Roosevelt also adamantly refused to grant 
immediate payment of the Bonus on the grounds that military service was a 
duty not a privilege and that able-bodied veterans should therefore be treated 
like any other group of citizens. Yet even a widely popular President in the 
midst of a severe economic crisis proved unable to steer veterans’ policy in a 
more inclusive direction. The fierce lobbying of veterans’ groups led Congress 
not only to reverse most of the cuts of the Economy Act but also to override a 
presidential veto in 1936 to pass immediate payment of the Bonus (Ortiz 2010). 
To be sure, FDR’s record on veterans’ issues was not altogether negative: for 
instance, he gave them preference in New Deal programs like the Civilian 
Conservation Camps. Still, overall the 1930s were a period of limited re-
trenchment: by 1940, spending on World War I veterans’ programs was still a 
quarter below its 1933 level, while the number of former soldiers and their 
survivors on the rolls was down by a third (Cogan 2017, 75).  
The pendulum swung yet again with the external shock of World War II, 
which contrary to how it is often portrayed – marked the defeat rather than the 
consolidation of FDR’s approach to social policy. New Dealers had hoped that 
the conflict would provide them with an opportunity to further cement the 
programs implemented in the previous decade, but a number of factors – such 
as growing Congressional opposition and unpopular labor strikes – produced 
the opposite result. Instead of comprehensive and national social policies such 
as health insurance or public assistance, the war saw the passage of “indirect 
and disjointed forms of public social provision” that targeted specific groups of 
the population rather than the entire citizenry (Amenta and Skocpol 1988). 
Veterans’ policy was the primary example of this larger path-dependent pat-
tern. At the beginning of the conflict, memories of the bitter divisions created 
by the interwar debate over pensions and the Bonus were still fresh in lawmak-
ers’ minds. They helped create a consensus that Congress needed to do more to 
soften the return of the next generation of veterans. Building on this wide-
spread sentiment, Progressives sought to design a demobilization plan that 
would address the needs of both former soldiers and civilians, and to lodge 
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administrative authority for such plans in a friendly entity like the Federal 
Security Agency (FSA), which Roosevelt had established in 1939. But the 
conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and right-wing Republicans who 
dominated Congress in wartime had no appetite for such proposals. They 
pushed instead to limit the scope of readjustment plans to former soldiers and 
their dependents. In this effort, they enjoyed the backing of both the veterans’ 
movement and the larger public, which supported any effort to reward the 
G.I.’s (Sparrow 2011). The result was legislation that not only extended all of 
the programs for earlier generations to World War II veterans, but also created 
a new category of veterans’ benefits with the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment 
Act, otherwise known as the “G.I. Bill of Rights.” This landmark law provided 
all former soldiers of the conflict with educational benefits, unemployment 
compensation, job search services, and housing, business, and farm loan guar-
anties. This was the first time in U.S. history that the federal government ex-
plicitly recognized that not just disabled but also able-bodied former soldiers 
needed assistance to readjust to civilian life (Ross 1969; Skocpol 1997; Alt-
schuler and Blumin 2009; Frydl 2009). Rather than limiting veterans’ rights, as 
FDR had long hoped, the war only ended up expanding them even further. 
As a result, in the postwar period veterans and their families were once 
again the most important beneficiaries of the U.S. welfare state. At its peak in 
1949, veterans’ spending reached $6.9 billion, nearly a third of all federal 
spending on social welfare (Carter et al. 2006, Table Ed297-310 and Bf188-
195). That same year, the VA was responsible not only for disability compen-
sation, pension, or retirement benefits for 2.3 million veterans, but also for 129 
hospitals admitting half a million patients a year as well as for over 7 million 
life insurance policies. With a staff of nearly 200,000, it had more personnel 
under its charge than any other federal entity save the Post Office and the mili-
tary (Administrator of Veterans Affairs 1950, 1-4). This was not all: by the 
early 1950s, nearly three-fifths of the federal civil service workforce were 
veterans or their relatives, up from only 15 percent in 1945 (American Legion 
1952, 173). The list of advantages available to former soldiers had grown so 
vast and expensive that Fortune magazine considered the American welfare 
state to be essentially a “veterans’ state” (Fortune 1952). 
This new spur of growth was the result of familiar mechanisms. The United 
States was again coming out of a total war in which its domestic economy and 
civilian population did not experience major destruction or suffering. The fact 
that the conflict mostly took place overseas gave G.I.’s a stronger claim that 
they – as opposed to civilians on the home front – had borne the costs of the 
war. The use of the draft reinforced their demands. Contrary to other victorious 
countries like France or Great Britain, the United States also emerged from the 
conflict with the wherewithal to spend lavishly on veterans’ programs. Not 
only did its former soldiers enjoy the prestige of victory, but they could make 
their claims on the same regime that had sent them to war – contrary to places 
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like postwar Germany or Japan, where the Allied occupation forbid any kind of 
social policy for veterans lest they would contribute to the return of militarism 
(Kasza 2018; Starke 2018). Finally, the existence of a powerful veterans’ 
movement during World War II meant that contrary to what had happened in 
the previous conflict, this time the G.I.’s had advocates in the halls of power. 
All these factors converged to form a perfect storm that consolidated the exclu-
sive trajectory in which U.S. veterans’ policy had long been engaged. 
Beyond the sheer increase in the scope and cost of veterans’ welfare state, 
World War II marked a turning point in the sense that it cemented its separation 
from civilian programs. Until then, the U.S. Congress had typically granted 
veterans’ benefits on an ad hoc and temporary basis, with each cohort receiving 
its own set of programs that were expected to expire after the demise of their 
last member. No unified system encompassing all veterans existed. The pen-
sion regime available to veterans of World War I was legally distinct from that 
of their Civil War elders, for instance. A major step toward a more permanent 
and comprehensive framework had been taken in 1930, when for the first time 
a single federal agency (the VA) was made responsible for the benefits of all 
veterans with no distinction of generation. Yet as we have seen, as late as 
World War II New Dealers were still hoping to place veterans’ programs into 
the hands of a “civilian” agency such as the FSA. The failure of their plans and 
the placement of the G.I. Bill under the authority of the VA set a precedent: in 
the postwar period, the idea that all veterans’ programs should be administered 
by the same separate agency would no longer be seriously questioned. This was 
also the time when all veterans’ legislation was brought under the jurisdiction 
of a single committee in the House of Representatives.
2
 Only in the mid-20th 
century, then, was the exclusive approach to veterans’ policy definitively em-
bedded in the structure of the state. 
Still, the triumph of martial citizenship was as complete as it was brief. The 
very generosity of G.I. Bill benefits enticed fraud; by the late 1940s, the press 
was full of the same accusations of scandals and corruption that had been made 
against the Civil War pension system in the Gilded Age or against the Veter-
ans’ Bureau after World War I (Frydl 2009). Partly in reaction to these charges, 
Congress granted Korean War veterans a series of benefits that were broadly 
similar to those from World War II (including their own G.I. Bill) but with less 
freedom of choice, stiffer penalties, and lower payments (Pash 2012). More 
broadly, the onset of the Cold War and the rise of the “national security state” 
                                                             
2  Prior to 1946, veterans’ bills had fallen under the responsibility of four different committees 
in the House, not all of them veteran-focused: the Committees on Pensions, the Committee 
on Invalid Pensions, the Ways and Means Committee (which was in charge of all financial 
matters), and the Committee on World War Veterans’ Legislation (created in 1924 to handle 
all bills related to World War I veterans, and to World War II veterans after January 1944). 
The Senate did not have its own committee on veterans’ affairs until 1970. 
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ushered in a new era for veterans’ policy. With the United States now em-
barked upon a long-term ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, the return 
of the peacetime draft in 1948 meant that the veteran population would steadily 
increase for the foreseeable future, leading many observers to fear that the 
country would soon become “a nation of veterans” where a vast portion of the 
population would be entitled to special treatment (New York Times 1953). 
Facing a continually rising defense budget, lawmakers had to find ways to 
make veterans’ programs more financially sustainable (Hogan 2000). 
A changed geopolitical outlook was not the only mechanism that placed vet-
erans’ welfare state under renewed pressure; the evolving landscape of social 
policy also played a role. While FDR had failed to prevent the passage of legis-
lation recognizing veterans’ special status during his own presidency, the new 
welfare programs that he created with the Social Security Act of 1935 never-
theless had an impact: no longer could veterans’ advocates claim that their 
constituents did not have access to an alternative safety net. By the 1950s, in 
fact, many experts were beginning to think that the growth of New Deal pro-
grams made a parallel welfare state for former soldiers outdated. Since veterans 
and their relatives could access many welfare programs as civilians, and since 
the draft turned military service into an almost universal obligation (for men) as 
opposed to a burden shouldered only by a few, the need to grant veterans spe-
cial benefits no longer seemed so acute. This was the central argument of the 
Commission on Veterans’ Pensions created by President Eisenhower, whose 
final report issued in 1956 found the view that “anyone who has served in the 
Armed Forces in wartime has a right to special privileges from the Government 
for the rest of his life” to be “clearly outmoded” (The President’s Commission 
on Veterans’ Pensions 1956, 134-5). The Commission recommended the even-
tual elimination of non-service-connected pensions, though it recognized that 
veterans who were disabled in service should continue to receive government 
assistance. Some of the Commission’s proposals were accepted, but the firm 
opposition of veterans’ groups succeeded in preventing most major cuts.  
In addition to these external mechanisms, the effort to expand martial citi-
zenship ran against deep divisions within the veterans’ movement itself. For 
instance, in the late 1950s some lawmakers pushed to pass a “Cold War G.I. 
Bill” that would extend some readjustment benefits to peacetime veterans, but 
without success. This setback was the result of opposition coming not only 
from the administration (which sought to expand welfare programs open to all 
citizens rather than those available only to veterans) but also from the Legion. 
In its view, peacetime veterans were less deserving than former soldiers who 
had served in wartime and should therefore not be entitled to the same pro-
grams (Boulton 2014, 59).  
All these trends converged during the Vietnam War. While Congress passed 
a new G.I. Bill in 1966 that provided all veterans who had served after 1955 
with educational and vocational training as well as housing assistance, the 
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monthly subsistence payments for veterans attending college were initially set 
at an even lower level than those for Korean veterans. With the major veterans’ 
organizations focused on defending the interests of previous generations of 
former soldiers (especially World War II, which formed the majority of their 
members), Vietnam War veterans were left largely without a voice in Washing-
ton, D.C. The less generous approach of the 1966 law stemmed not only from 
the fact that it was meant to apply to both peacetime and wartime veterans, but 
also from President Lyndon Johnson’s focus on expanding general welfare 
programs. Given the budgetary pressures created by the war effort, he was 
reluctant to increase spending on programs that targeted only a specific portion 
of the population (Boulton 2014). 
3. Conclusion 
The year 1973 marked the end of both direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam 
War and conscription. With the return to a professional military, veterans’ 
benefits assumed once again the role that they had played in the days of the 
Revolutionary War, namely of enticing recruits into the military. This similari-
ty notwithstanding, the situation of veterans’ policy in the 1970s had of course 
little in common with what it had been two centuries earlier. The U.S. veterans’ 
welfare had now reached colossal proportions, offering a wider array of bene-
fits to a larger proportion of the veteran population than those available in 
virtually any other country.  
Scholars have tended to see this peculiar outcome as predetermined by a 
uniquely American tradition of respect for the military. As we have seen in this 
article, nothing could be further from the truth: throughout their history, Amer-
icans have been no less critical of their veterans than other nations, and the 
adoption of an exclusive policy that treated former soldiers as a separate and 
privileged group was far from irresistible. The path taken by U.S. veterans’ 
policy was determined not by an exceptional cultural trait but rather by the 
specific timing of various mechanisms that were in no way unique to this coun-
try. 
Several of these stand out. The frequency of warfare in U.S. history explains 
why veterans were able to make claims on the state so early and so consistent-
ly. The fact that most of these wars were victorious and that they did not seri-
ously damage the country’s civilian population or its economy meant not only 
that the United States could reward its soldiers, but also that veterans could 
more credibly claim to have shouldered most of the burden of war and there-
fore argue that they deserved privileged status. The adoption of the draft during 
the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War gave the claims 
of their former soldiers even more legitimacy. The relative absence of welfare 
programs available to all civilians prior to the New Deal helps explain why 
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veterans demanded their own programs. The enfranchisement of white men, 
which occurred earlier in the United States than in other industrialized coun-
tries, contributed to making the political system receptive to the claims of vet-
erans, who during the period covered in this article belonged overwhelmingly 
to this group of the population. Finally, the lack of any systematic counter-
mobilization made the demands of the veterans’ movement much harder to 
resist.  
This is of course not a comprehensive list, not only because of the limita-
tions of space imposed by this article but also due to the relative lack of re-
search in comparative veterans’ policy. As more work on this topic emerges, 
we will surely know more about what made the United States similar to or 
different from other countries. Rather than focusing on the specific nature of 
these mechanisms, we should therefore remember that it was the timing in 
which they followed each other that mattered: the fact that veterans were the 
first group to obtain their own selective entitlement program so early in the 
history of U.S. state-building helped cement their separate position, setting into 
motion a slow-moving and path-dependent process of policy expansion and 
consolidation that was sometimes halted but never reversed over the next cen-
turies. We are still living with the consequences. 
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